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Abstract 
In this paper we present a deeper analysis than has 
previously been carried out of a selective attention 
problem, and the evolution of continuous-time recur-
rent neural networks to solve it.  We show that the 
task has a rich structure, and agents must solve a va-
riety of subproblems to perform well.  We consider 
the relationship between the complexity of an agent 
and the ease with which it can evolve behavior that 
generalizes well across subproblems, and demon-
strate a shaping protocol that improves 
generalization. 
1. Introduction 
Within the adaptive behavior community, it is widely be-
lieved that situated, embodied and dynamical approaches 
have significant implications for cognitive science (Miller, 
1994; Clark, 1997; Harvey, 2000).  In order to realize this 
potential, however, we must create model agents capable of 
minimally cognitive behavior, the simplest behavior that 
raises issues of genuine cognitive interest.  Toward this end, 
we have previously evolved dynamical “nervous systems” 
for a variety of minimally cognitive behaviors, including 
categorical perception, short-term memory and selective 
attention (Beer, 1996; Slocum et al., 2000).   
Our primary motivation for these studies has been to in-
vestigate the mechanisms by which the evolved agents 
operate. For example, a detailed dynamical analysis of an 
evolved agent capable of visually-guided object discrimina-
tion has recently been carried out (Beer, in press). This 
analysis involved characterizing (1) the dynamics of the 
entire evolved brain-body-environment system, (2) the dy-
namics of the agent and environment subsystems and the 
interactions that give rise to the observed behavior of the 
coupled system, and (3) the neuronal properties underlying 
the agent dynamics.  
In attempting to apply these techniques to more complex 
behaviors, we have found it necessary to first understand in 
detail the structure of the minimally cognitive tasks that we 
set. While simple tasks may have only one or a small set of 
obvious best solutions, more complex tasks may involve 
tradeoffs that interact in complicated ways. These tradeoffs 
must be understood before a detailed dynamical analysis of 
agents performing such tasks can be undertaken. 
In this paper, we perform a task analysis of the selective 
attention problem. First, we present a largely unsuccessful 
attempt to quantify the difficulty of this task.  We then dem-
onstrate that this attempt fails because the task has 
considerably more structure than is initially apparent, con-
taining many different subproblems on which different 
evolved agents specialize in different ways.  Next, we pre-
sent the beginnings of a taxonomy of these subproblems and 
their particular difficulties, and show that the overall suc-
cess of different agents can be understood in these terms.  
Finally, we demonstrate that, in random trials, these differ-
ent subproblems occur with frequencies that sometimes 
differ by orders of magnitude.  By manipulating these fre-
quencies, we can put selective pressure on the evolution of 
agents that perform better on the harder subproblems, or 
that generalize better across the full range of subproblems. 
2. Methods 
Agents are trained to handle a selective attention task 
(Slocum et.al., 2000; Downey 2000).  An agent, with lim-
ited sensory capability, is required to catch two falling 
objects.  The agent is represented by a circle, and is capable 
of moving horizontally.  The falling objects, also circles, 
have separate constant velocity, and are constrained such 
that the agent should be capable of catching both. 
An agent is a circle of diameter 30, having 9 proximity 
sensors of range 205 evenly distributed over a visual angle 
of π/6.  The world the agent exists in is 400 units wide.  The 
agent can not move outside of this world, however, it also 
has no way to know that it has been stopped at the edge.  
The agent’s horizontal velocity is proportional to the sum of 
two opposing motor neurons’ output.  The constant of pro-
portionality is 5, thus, the maximum velocity of the agent in 
either direction is 5.  The falling objects have diameter 26.  
  
The first object’s vertical velocity is in the range [3,4], 
while the second object’s vertical velocity is in the range 
[1,2].  Both objects horizontal velocities are in the range [–
2, 2].  The objects are constrained to start within the agent’s 
field of view, and travel in such a way as it is always possi-
ble for the agent to catch both.  The faster object will 
always land first.  The second object will land so that it can 
be reached by the agent traveling at 5α, where α is a scaling 
factor, set to 0.7, to ensure the agent would be capable of 
catching both objects.  When an object lands, it is removed 
from the simulation, so that it does not confuse the agent’s 
visual sensors.  See Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1:  The agent can move horizontally in order to catch the 2 
objects which fall from above. 
 
An agent’s behavior is controlled by a continuous-time 
recurrent neural network (CTRNN) with the following state 
equation: 
τi y.i = −yi +‚
j=1
N
wji σ  Hgj Hyj + θjLL + Ii i = 1, ..., N
 
Where y is the state of each neuron, τ is its time constant, 
wij is the strength of the connection from the jth to the ith 
neuron, g is a gain, θ is a bias term, σ (x)=1/(1 + e-x) is the 
standard logistic activation function, and I represents an 
external input (zero on all but sensory neurons).  A forward 
Euler method with a step size of 0.1 was used to integrate 
the CTRNN. 
The CTRNN is constrained to be bilaterally symmetric, 
with 9 sensory neurons, a set even number of interneurons, 
and 2 motor neurons.  Sensory neurons only receive input 
from the environment, but they connect to all interneurons 
and motor neurons.  The interneurons and motor neurons 
are fully interconnected (every interneuron or motor neuron 
is connected to every other interneuron or motor neuron).  
Agents are constrained to bilateral symmetry both to sim-
plify the problem and to ensure that an agent will act the 
same in mirror situations.  All sensory neurons share the 
same gain and bias, interneuron and motor neuron biases are 
constrained to the range of [–5,5], and motor neuron gains 
are fixed at 5.  All gains are positive, and all time constants 
are greater than 1.   
The parameters of agents were evolved using a real-
valued genetic algorithm (Mitchell, 1996).  An individual 
agent was represented by a real-value vector of length M.  
Initially a population of 100 individuals was created by set-
ting their evolvable parameters to random numbers in the 
range [–1, 1].  The top 2 individuals were copied into the 
next generation automatically.  The remaining individuals 
were created by mutation.  A linear-rank based method was 
used to select individuals for mutation.  A selected parent 
was mutated by adding a vector whose direction was ran-
domly distributed on an M-dimensional hypersphere and 
whose magnitude was a Gaussian random variable with 
mean 0 and variance σ2, of 1.  Agents were trained over 
9000 generations. 
An agent’s performance on any individual trial was (200 
– p), where p is the error, measured as the sum of the abso-
lute distances between the center of the agent and the center 
of the falling objects when they land.  Therefore, the maxi-
mum performance of an agent on any trial is 200.  Agents 
are ranked based upon their average performance for a set 
of trials.  For purposes of reporting, agent performance will 
be given as a percentage of the maximum possible. 
Agents were trained using a shaping scheme.  As evolu-
tion continues, the agents were presented with more 
difficult problems.  Each agent was trained on a set of 30 
trials.  Over time, the trials that the agent performs best on 
were replaced with others.  Whenever the best agent per-
formed better than a threshold T, or 600 generations passed 
since the last trial change, the trial that it performed best at 
was replaced with a new trial.  The first 5 of these new trials 
were hand selected.  Subsequently, new trials were gener-
ated by selecting the first random trial that the agent 
performs worse than 170 on.  T = 198 – n/14 – gen/2500, 
where n is the number of additional trials added, and gen is 
the current generation.  For work using similar incremental 
shaping schemes to guide evolution or learning towards 
flexible behavior, see (Dorigo & Colombetti, 1994; Saksida 
et.al., 1997). 
3. Task Difficulty 
How difficult is this selective attention task?  A more diffi-
cult task should provide for a more interesting minimally 
cognitive behavior study.  A good way to show the diffi-
culty of a task is to consider how complex an agent is 
needed to solve it.  For our task, we trained agents with dif-
fering numbers of interneurons.  16 genetic algorithm runs 
were done for each number of interneurons.   
  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Interneurons
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
ecnamrofreP
 
Figure 2: The best and average performance for each set of in-
terneurons.  Best performance is solid boxes, average is outlined 
boxes. 
Figure 2 shows an unexpected result: agents with low 
numbers of interneurons are still capable of performing the 
task as well as higher numbers of interneurons.  The best 2 
interneuron agent is able to perform as well as all of the 
other agents.  The best performance only drops when zero 
interneuron agents (purely reactive agents, with feed for-
ward connections from the sensor neurons to the motor 
neurons) are considered.  An agent with two interneurons 
should not be able to hold as much internal state as agents 
with 8, 10, or 12 interneurons, and yet is still capable of 
performing as well.  This seems to go directly against our 
beliefs that this task requires both short-term memory and 
selective attention, cognitive abilities that should require 
more internal state.  Previous work on this problem 
(Downey, 2000) suggested that the ideal number of in-
terneurons would be 10, and yet a 2-interneuron agent can 
perform as well as a 10 interneuron agent. 
The mean values in Figure 2 show a more expected 
shape.  These values suggest that while a 2-interneuron 
agent is capable of solving the problem, training it to do so 
is more difficult. 
At first, the surprisingly small difference in performance 
between the best agent of each type would seem to imply 
that the task is simpler than had previously been assumed 
(Downey, 2000).  We contend that it is misleading to treat 
this task as uniformly complex.  Closer analysis shows that 
the complexity of the task, and of the agent architecture 
required to accomplish it, varies considerably from one trial 
to another.  The interaction between the random task pa-
rameters makes some trials entirely trivial, but others are 
more difficult for the agents. 
4. A Taxonomy of Subproblems 
Detailed analysis of the task parameters and their effects 
shows that there is a wide variety of subtasks, ranging from 
the entirely trivial to very difficult cases on which only a 
small proportion of agents perform well.  Previous work 
(Downey, 2000) considered four subgroups of trials, and 
found significant variance between the agents’ performance 
across these subgroups.  We are incrementally refining this 
classification, to which end we divided a sample of 100,000 
randomly generated trials into 24 mutually exclusive cate-
gories according to salient features of the setup. 
Comparisons of several agents’ performance across these 
trial categories showed that many could be meaningfully 
grouped together, and that it was more useful to base these 
groupings on the demands they make of the agent, or the 
strategies an agent could use to perform well on them.  This 
produces overlapping groups, which we describe below.  
After eliminating the easiest trial types, we consider those 
that require some short-term memory and those that set a 
selective attention task more difficult than simply ignoring 
the more distant object from the start of the trial, before 
looking at some special cases. 
Subsequent analysis of the individual agents’ perform-
ance will focus on their relative strengths and weaknesses, 
from the perspective of the problems they have to solve in 
particular trial groups.  Rather than presenting a full taxon-
omy, this section will set out the main groupings that will be 
used to illustrate the evolved agents’ strengths and weak-
nesses. 
4.1 Trivial trial types 
  
Figure 3:  Trivial trial types:  an instance for which the agent need 
not move at all (left) and one for which it need only move reac-
tively (right).  In all figures in this section the agent is shown as an 
empty circle, its field of vision is between the dashed lines, the 
objects are shown as filled circles with their trajectories as ar-
rows, and the darker object (which starts to the left) lands first.  
Here a horizontal line indicates the second object’s height when 
the first lands. 
Some trials make very few demands of an agent, and there-
fore provide little information when analyzed.  An obvious 
example of this is that it is possible for both objects to land 
directly on the agent’s starting position, in which case the 
agent will get a perfect score by simply not moving at all.  
This caricature example is rather rare, accounting for only 
5.2% of trials, but there is a more common subgroup of tri-
als which can be dismissed as trivial because they only 
require purely reactive behavior of the agent.  Any trial in 
which the object that starts closer to the agent is the first to 
land, and the second object is within the agent’s field of 
vision when the first is caught, is trivial in this sense.  Alto-
gether, such trials account for 31% of the total.  An example 
of each of these is shown in Figure 3 above. 
  
4.2 Selective attention problems 
  
Figure 4:  “delayed decision” (left) and “unseen passing” trials 
(right).  Here the horizontal lines indicate the height at which the 
darker object overtakes the lighter one. 
Selective attention becomes a more difficult problem when 
the object that will land first starts further away from the 
agent than the other.  Two examples of this are shown in 
Figure 4 above.  We will refer to trials in which the object 
that starts further away lands first as “delayed decision” 
trials, because the agent can not correctly choose which 
object to catch first until it has observed them moving.  
These instances make up 48% of all randomly generated 
trials1. 
A more difficult subset of the “delayed decision” trials 
occurs when the faster object passes the slower one at a 
large enough horizontal distance that the agent can not see 
both.  In these cases, the correct choice of which object to 
follow can no longer be made based on distance information 
alone; the objects’ relative speeds must be considered as 
well.  We call such instances “unseen passing” trials, and 
they account for only 0.099% of the total. 
4.3 Short-term memory problems 
  
Figure 5:  “object permanence” (left) and “overlapping objects” 
(right) trials.  Here the horizontal line indicates the height of the 
second object when the first lands. 
Another class of trials requires the agent to store informa-
tion so that it can find an object again after having to lose 
sight of it.  We consider two such situations, as illustrated 
by Figure 5 above. 
If the second object is not within the agent’s field of vi-
sion when the first is caught, then the agent must move 
towards the second object without being able to see it.  This 
                                                          
1 Such instances account for less than 50% of all trials because 
randomly generated trials in which the two objects will land too 
far apart for the agent to catch both are rejected.  This rejection 
criterion affects a slightly higher proportion of parameter sets in 
which the object that starts higher also moves faster. 
requires both that the agent stores information about the 
unseen object, and that it switches its attention to this inter-
nal information in response to catching the first object.  
These “object permanence” trials account for 39% of the 
total. 
An additional difficulty is presented when the two objects 
cross horizontally, or start with a horizontal overlap.  The 
poor sensory resolution of the agent means that as long as a 
group of neighboring rays are all broken, it will not be clear 
whether they are being broken by one large object or multi-
ple smaller ones, and one object can be entirely occluded by 
the other.  In such cases, which account for 58.6% of the 
total, it is possible for the agent to follow the correct object 
at the start but be fooled by the overlap, and switch its atten-
tion as a result. 
4.4 ‘Cheat’ heuristics and their limitations 
For each subset of trials, it is possible for an agent to catch 
both objects by the using one of various simple ‘cheat’ heu-
ristics.  However, each such heuristic applied uniformly will 
only solve a small proportion of all trials; reliable perform-
ance requires a more flexible set of responses from the 
agent.  For instance, an agent which always follows the ob-
ject that starts further away will be successful on the 
delayed decision trials, but its overall performance will be 
poor because it will fail to catch the first object on the more 
straightforward trials. 
The short-term memory requirement can also be circum-
vented for a subset of trials by the agent automatically 
moving in a pre-set direction after catching the first object if 
the second is not within sight, and switching to reactive 
behavior once it has moved far enough that it can see the 
second object again.  However, any such behavior will 
guarantee failure to catch the second object on a proportion 
of trials (as shown in Figure 8 below).  The most successful 
pre-set heuristic would be to continue in the same direction 
after the first catch, which will succeed in 78% of “object 
permanence” trials (making up 30% of all trials), but still 
guarantees failure in the remaining “object permanence” 
trials, which account for 8.4% of all random trials. 
4.5 Summary 
The taxonomy presented above is not a comprehensive clas-
sification of all the subtleties of this task, but a step towards 
this goal.  The variety of different subtasks, different com-
binations of which are involved in each random trial, 
ensures that agents must have some degree of behavioral 
flexibility to perform well across all trial types.  The 
following section will illustrate the interaction between 
individual agents and different trial types. 
  
5. Individual Variation 
The agents we have evolved show a wide variety of behav-
ior patterns, and relative strengths and weaknesses.  In this 
section we present some illustrative examples of the range 
of agents we have evolved, and how they are differentially 
affected by the complexities of the task. 
We use two different performance metrics to compare the 
performance of agents on various subsets of trials.  The fit-
ness measure described in Section 2 above will be used, but 
it is supplemented with a binary measure of whether each 
object is caught by the agent on each given trial, because 
this can make analysis clearer.  A catch is defined as any 
collision between the agent and the object, without neces-
sarily having to be exactly aligned, and we report the 
percentage of trials in which the agent catches each or both 
objects.  The agents were tested on the same batch of 
100,000 randomly generated trials described in Section 4 
above, and their performance was recorded for various sub-
sets of these trials defined by the combinations of 
parameters. 
5.1 A blind spot for the best agent 
It is instructive to begin the analysis with the best perform-
ing agent that we have generated to date.  This agent has 10 
interneurons, an overall fitness score of 97%, and catches 
both objects in 99% of all trials.  It performs reliably well 
across almost all trial categories, catching both objects with 
100% reliability in many, and with better than 97% reliabil-
ity in all but one.  However, its performance in the “unseen 
passing” situation is strikingly poor:  earning a fitness score 
of 27%, and it only catches both objects in 20% of these 
trials. 
In fact, closer analysis shows that this agent almost al-
ways (95% of trials) succeeds in catching the second object 
in these cases; it is the first object that it has trouble with 
(only catching it in 25% of trials).  An example of its typical 
behavior is illustrated by figure 6 below.  It seems that this 
agent has evolved a strategy of choosing the closer object 
when it is no longer possible to keep both within sight.  In 
most trials (all but the “unseen passing” type described in 
Section 4.2 above, which only accounts for 0.099% of the 
total) this strategy will lead to a correct choice of the first 
object.  It does fail consistently on one subgroup of trials, 
but because this subgroup is so rare it still allows the agent 
to score impressively well overall.  
This striking weakness in an otherwise highly performing 
agent shows that the task is not uniformly complex, but 
rather that special cases provide particular challenges for the 
agent.  Conversely, the trial type on which a particular agent 
performs worst will not necessarily be the hardest type for 
all other agents, as the next subsection will show.  
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Figure 6: The best agent usually fails to catch the first object in the 
“unseen passing” situation.  The first object’s trace ends when it 
reaches the agent’s level. 
5.2 “Unseen passing” trials are tractable 
There are also agents for which the “unseen passing” trials 
present little or no handicap, but which have weaknesses on 
other trial types.  The best performance on this subgroup of 
trials was from an agent with only 4 interneurons, which 
scored almost as well on this subset as on average.  The 
overall fitness for this agent is 91%, and it catches both ob-
jects in 92% of all trials; clearly less reliable than the agent 
described in 5.1 above.  However, in the “unseen passing” 
situation it catches both objects in 89% of trials. 
There are other subsets of trials which give this agent 
more trouble than the “unseen passing” ones.  Its worst per-
formance is for a subset that we were not expecting to 
provide particular difficulties:  where the first object starts 
directly above the agent, and both objects fall diagonally in 
the same direction, without crossing in the horizontal plane, 
as illustrated in Figure 7 below.  These trials account for 
0.74% of the total, and this agent manages to catch both 
objects in only 76% of such trials. 
 
Figure 7:  The trial setup on which the agent described in Section 
5.2 performs worst. 
  
5.3 Fixed action patterns 
Both of the agents described above perform well enough in 
general that they do seem to be responding to the task in a 
generalized manner.  There are others that show evidence of 
using a much simpler approach.  Another 4-interneuron 
agent provides a particularly striking example of this. 
This agent’s overall performance is not impressive:  it has 
a fitness of only 59%, and catches both objects in 67% of all 
trials.  However, there is a subset of nontrivial trials for 
which its performance is far better than this.  For trials 
which can be solved by rigidly applying the heuristic of 
“follow the closer object, and then continue to move in the 
same direction to find the other after catching it” (as shown 
in Figure 8 (left) below) this agent catches both objects in 
97% of trials.  By contrast, it only catches both objects in 
46% of trials for which it would have to reverse its move-
ment after the first catch (shown in Figure 8 (right)). 
  
Figure 8:  The types of trial soluble by two different fixed action 
patterns:  Continuing in the same direction after catching the first 
object (left) or reversing direction (right) 
Breaking down the data further shows that this agent 
catches the first object reliably in most trial types (99.9% of 
those shown in Figure 8 (left), 93% of those shown in Fig-
ure 8 (right), and 97% of all trials), so the variation in its 
performance comes almost entirely from what it does after 
the first catch.  It catches the second object with 97% reli-
ability in the “continue in the same direction after the first 
catch” cases, as compared with only 53% in the “reverse 
after the first catch” trials, and 70% overall. 
A similar pattern, though less pronounced, is shown by 4 
other 4-interneuron agents out of the 16 we have evolved, 
so while it does not account for the majority of results it is 
clearly not a unique instance.  Our speculative explanation 
is that this is a comparatively easy strategy to evolve within 
the limitations of the 4-interneuron architecture, and be-
cause the trials on which this strategy fails account for a 
relatively small proportion of the total, the poor perform-
ance on these does not drag down overall fitness enough for 
these agents to always die out in evolution.  More analysis 
needs to be done before this can be stated authoritatively. 
5.4 What can be done with 2 interneurons 
In general, it does appear harder to evolve agents that per-
form well with smaller numbers of interneurons.  Agents 
with fewer interneurons also tend to perform more inconsis-
tently across different trial types, indicating that they are 
more likely to rely on simple ‘tricks’ to solve the majority 
of subproblems.  However, the best performing 2-
interneuron agent performs surprisingly well across all trial 
types. 
This agent has an overall fitness of 94% (as compared 
with the best agent of all, which was described in 5.1 and 
scores 97%), and catches both objects in 97% of all trials 
(as compared to 99% for the best agent).  Its weakest per-
formance is on the same “unseen passing” trials that stymie 
the best agent, but it is actually far less handicapped by this 
subset, earning a fitness score of 74% and catching both 
objects for 68% of such instances (as compared to only 20% 
for the otherwise superior agent described in 5.1). 
One possible explanation for this agent’s high overall 
performance is that it has developed a sort of toolkit of sim-
ple solutions to specific subproblems, and is able to select 
the right one in most cases.  However, the standard devia-
tion for this agent’s reliability across all of the trial sub-
types we have analyzed is 6.8 (as compared to 27 for the 
particularly inconsistent agent described in 5.3 above) indi-
cating overall flexibility of behavior.  Furthermore, it is 
hard to see how an agent with only two interneurons–and 
therefore only two pathways from visual input to motor 
output–could have a comprehensive repertoire of ‘pro-
grammed’ behaviors. 
All of these data point to this agent having evolved a gen-
eral strategy that is robust to the various different types of 
problem presented by different trial parameters, in spite of 
having such a simple control architecture.  However, this is 
not true of any other 2-interneuron agents in the 16 we have 
evolved.  It seems to be the case that while more interneu-
rons are not necessary to perform well on this task, they 
make evolving reliable solutions considerably easier.  This 
is borne out by the difference between the mean fitness of 
agents with 2 interneurons and those with 10, as shown in 
Figure 2 above; while this good 2-interneuron agent is an 
outlier, the best 8 or 10-interneuron agents are not far re-
moved from the average performers in their class.  This is a 
finding that needs more analysis and a larger number of 
evolution runs than time has permitted at this point. 
5.5 Summary 
The examples discussed above show that the task we are 
analyzing has a richly varied set of subtasks, which make 
different demands of our evolved agents.  Because they are 
categorically different subtasks, rather than degrees of diffi-
culty along one dimension, agents can develop idiosyncratic 
patterns of relative strengths and weaknesses, with a subtask 
that stymies one agent providing no trouble at all for an-
other.  The selective weaknesses of generally high 
performing agents can be at least partly explained by the 
rarity ‘in the wild’ of the trial types on which they fail; they 
have not evolved an appropriate response to situations that 
were either never or very rarely encountered during evolu-
  
tion.  Section 6 below presents an attempt at testing this 
hypothesis. 
The consistently high performance of the best 2-
interneuron agent proves that 2 interneurons are sufficient 
to develop a generalized response to the task, contrary to 
our previous expectations.  However, the exceptional nature 
of this agent, contrasted with the high average performance 
of 10-interneuron agents suggests that 10-interneuron archi-
tectures are far more likely to evolve good solutions.  It may 
be that producing such a range of behaviors with such a 
simple architecture requires a very precise, and therefore 
brittle, combination of parameters, though this is a tentative 
explanation that needs more work to support it. 
6. Improving Generalization 
By modifying the trials an agent sees during training, we 
can increase performance on any subproblem, hopefully 
allowing for greater generalization. 
An agent is exposed to a surprisingly small number of tri-
als throughout its evolution.  An agent will always be 
evaluated on 30 trials.  New trials are added by replacing 
the trial that the agent does best on.  During training, an 
agent will be introduced to a new trial when it is performing 
around 99%, or 600 generations after the last new trial was 
introduced.  The performance limit for introducing a new 
trial is prohibitively high, therefore, it can be assumed that 
an agent will be introduced to a new trial every 600 genera-
tions, so only 14 trials will be added during the 9000 
generations of training2.  The first 35 trials are hand selected 
to encourage a valid solution to be formed, the remainder 
are selected from a group of 30 randomly generated trials, 
where the first one found to cause the current top-
performing agent to fail (score below 85%) is added.  In-
formal observation says that it is unusual for more than 30 
trials to be generated before the agent fails on one.  Thus, a 
reasonable upper bound for the number of trials an agent 
will encounter during training is 305 (including the initial 
35 trials).   
There are a large variety of subproblems, and many are 
quite rare.  An example is the “unseen passing” subproblem, 
which only occurs 0.099% of the time.  With this extreme 
rarity, the expected number of “unseen passing” trails that 
an agent will see during training is less than 0.2673. 
By changing the trials an agent is exposed to during train-
ing, we should be able to increase performance in different 
subproblems.  To test this hypothesis, the shaping schedule 
was modified to include one “unseen passing” problem.  By 
introducing one “unseen passing” problem early in training 
we give agents much longer to train on the “unseen pass-
ing” subproblem.  If an agent was to encounter an “unseen 
passing” trial during standard shaping, it would most likely 
                                                          
2 Additional trials are actually introduced at generation 601, 
1202, 1803…  This causes only 14 trials to be added over 9000 
generations. 
be in a later generation, giving the genetic algorithm less 
time to evolve good solutions.  Figure 9 below shows the 
average performance on the “unseen passing” subproblem 
for agents trained normally and those trained with the modi-
fied shaping.  Due to time constraints, only 4 agents could 
be evolved for each number of interneurons on the modified 
shaping.  16 agents were evolved for each number of in-
terneuron using standard shaping.  The average score for 
agents with modified shaping is higher than standard agents, 
showing that an agent’s performance on a subtask can be 
improved by modifying the shaping.  While the best per-
forming agents were evolved with the standard shaping, we 
believe this is an artifact of having 4 times more standard 
shaping agents. 
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Figure 9:  Performance on “unseen passing” subproblem with and 
without shaping modified to include an “unseen passing” trial.  
Error bars represent the standard error of the averages. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have revisited a selective attention task 
which has previously been considered (Slocum et al., 2000; 
Downey, 2000) and analyzed the problem space in greater 
depth.  Empirical observation of a selection of agents 
evolved for this task has shown that their performance does 
not vary monotonically across parameter sets.  Instead, there 
is a rich substructure within the problem space, consisting 
of a range of distinct subproblems that agents must solve to 
perform well. 
Our agents have evolved distinct behavioral responses to 
the variety of subproblems, as shown by the heterogeneous 
pattern of strengths and weaknesses.  Our results to date 
indicate that agents with more complex control architectures 
are easier to evolve robust behavior with, but that this is 
possible even with only 2 interneurons.  We have also 
found that the relative frequency with which agents are ex-
posed to a given subproblem during evolution influences 
the likelihood that the agent will develop an appropriate 
response to it, and manipulated this effect to increase the 
reliability with which we can evolve agents whose behavior 
generalizes. 
  
We believe that understanding the dynamics of an 
evolved agent requires us to also understand the subtleties 
of the task for which they are evolved.  The selective atten-
tion task we are using turns out to have a more complex 
structure than is at first apparent, and analyzing this has 
helped us to characterize the agents. 
There are several directions for future work that we be-
lieve will be productive.  Our decomposition of the problem 
space is not yet exhaustive, and extending this will probably 
allow us to make finer-grained distinctions between behav-
ior patterns.  This in turn would support a more detailed 
analysis of individual agents, linking the internal dynamics 
of the CTRNNs to their observed behavior.  Such an analy-
sis would help us to understand how an agent with as few as 
2 interneurons can perform well on subproblems requiring a 
combination of short-term memory and selective attention. 
We have made various tentative claims about the relative 
difficulty of evolving robust behavior with different num-
bers of interneurons.  Evaluating these claims fully will 
require a more detailed characterization of the fitness space, 
which in turn will allow us to further refine the shaping 
protocol and produce robust behavior more reliably. 
Acknowledgments 
This work was supported in part by grant EIA-0130773 
from the NSF. 
References 
Beer, R.D. (1996). Toward the evolution of dynamical 
neural networks for minimally cognitive behavior. In P. 
Maes, M. Mataric, J. Meyer, J. Pollack and S. Wilson 
(eds.), From animals to animats 4: Proceedings of the 
Fourth International Conference on Simulation of 
Adative Behavior (pp. 421-429). MIT Press. 
Beer, R.D. (in press). The dynamics of active categorical 
perception in an evolved model agent. To appear in 
Adaptive Behavior. 
Clark, A. (1997). Being There:  Putting Brain, Body, and 
World Together Again.  MIT Press.  
Dorigo, M. and Colombetti, M. (1994). Robot Shaping: 
Developing Situated Agents through Learning.  Artificial 
Intelligence 70(2):321-370. 
Downey, D.C.  (2000).  An Evolution of Minimally 
Cognitive Behavior:  Short-term memory and selective 
attention..  M.S. Thesis.  EECS Department, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
Harvey, I. (2000) Robotics: Philosophy of Mind using a 
Screwdriver. In T. Gomi (ed.) Evolutionary Robotics: 
From Intelligent Robots to Artificial Life, Vol. III (pp. 
207-230). AAI Books. 
Miller, G.E. (1994) Artificial life as theoretical biology: 
how to do real science with computer simulation. 
Cognitive Science Research Paper 378. School of 
Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex. 
Mitchell, M. (1996). An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms.  
MIT Press. 
Saksida, L.M., Raymond, S.M. and Touretzky, D.S. (1997). 
Shaping robot behavior using principles from 
instrumental conditioning.  Robotics and Autonomous 
Systems 22(3-4):231-249. 
Slocum, A.C., Downey, D.C. and Beer, R.D. (2000). 
Further experiments in the evolution of minimally 
cognitive behavior: From perceiving affordances to 
selective attention. In J. Meyer, A. Berthoz, D. Floreano, 
H. Roitblat and S. Wilson (eds.), From Animals to 
Animats 6: Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 430-
439). MIT Press. 
